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Abstract
The large-scale deployment of modern phishing at-
tacks relies on the automatic exploitation of vulner-
able websites in the wild, to maximize profit while
hindering attack traceability, detection and blacklist-
ing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work that specifically leverages this adversarial be-
havior for detection purposes. We show that phish-
ing webpages can be accurately detected by highlight-
ing HTML code and visual differences with respect
to other (legitimate) pages hosted within a compro-
mised website. Our system, named DeltaPhish, can
be installed as part of a web application firewall, to
detect the presence of anomalous content on a web-
site after compromise, and eventually prevent access
to it. DeltaPhish is also robust against adversarial at-
tempts in which the HTML code of the phishing page
is carefully manipulated to evade detection. We em-
pirically evaluate it on more than 5,500 webpages col-
lected in the wild from compromised websites, show-
ing that it is capable of detecting more than 99%
of phishing webpages, while only misclassifying less
than 1% of legitimate pages. We further show that
the detection rate remains higher than 70% even un-
der very sophisticated attacks carefully designed to
evade our system.
∗Preprint version of the work accepted for publication at
ESORICS 2017.
1 Introduction
In spite of more than a decade of research, phishing
is still a concrete, widespread threat that leverages
social engineering to acquire confidential data from
victim users [1]. Phishing scams are often part of
a profit-driven economy, where stolen data is sold
in underground markets [4, 5]. They may be even
used to achieve political or military objectives [2, 3].
To maximize profit, as most of the current cyber-
crime activities, modern phishing attacks are auto-
matically deployed on a large scale, exploiting vul-
nerabilities in publicly-available websites through the
so-called phishing kits [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. These toolkits
automatize the creation of phishing webpages on hi-
jacked legitimate websites, and advertise the newly-
created phishing sites to attract potential victims us-
ing dedicated spam campaigns. The data harvested
by the phishing campaign is then typically sold on
the black market, and part of the profit is reinvested
to further support the scam campaign [4, 5]. To
realize the importance of such a large-scale under-
ground economy, note that, according to the most
recent Global Phishing Survey by APWG, published
in 2014, 59, 485 out of the 87, 901 domains linked to
phishing scams (i.e., the 71.4%) were actually point-
ing to legitimate (compromised) websites [8].
Compromising vulnerable, legitimate websites does
not only enable a large-scale deployment of phishing
attacks; it also provides several other advantages for
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Figure 1: Homepage (left), legitimate (middle) and phishing (right) pages hosted in a compromised website.
cyber-criminals. First, it does not require them to
take care of registering domains and deal with hosting
services to deploy their scam. This also circumvents
recent approaches that detect malicious domains by
evaluating abnormal domain behaviors (e.g., burst
registrations, typosquatting domain names), induced
by the need of automatizing domain registration [9].
On the other hand, website compromise is only a piv-
oting step towards the final goal of the phishing scam.
In fact, cyber-criminals normally leave the legitimate
pages hosted in the compromised website intact. This
allows them to hide the presence of website compro-
mise not only from the eyes of its legitimate owner
and users, but also from blacklisting mechanisms and
browser plug-ins that rely on reputation services (as
legitimate sites tend to have a good reputation) [4].
For these reasons, malicious webpages in compro-
mised websites remain typically undetected for a
longer period of time. This has also been highlighted
in a recent study by Han et al. [4], in which the au-
thors have exposed vulnerable websites (i.e., honey-
pots) to host and monitor phishing toolkits. They
have reported that the first victims usually connect
to phishing webpages within a couple of days after
the hosting website has been compromised, while the
phishing website is blacklisted by common services
like Google Safe Browsing and PhishTank after ap-
proximately twelve days, on average. The same au-
thors have also pointed out that the most sophisti-
cated phishing kits include functionalities to evade
blacklisting mechanisms. The idea is to redirect the
victim to a randomly-generated subfolder within the
compromised website, where the attacker has pre-
viously installed another copy of the phishing kit.
Even if the victim realizes that he/she is visiting a
phishing webpage, he/she will be likely to report the
randomly-generated URL of the visited webpage (and
not that of the redirecting one), which clearly makes
blacklisting unable to stop this scam.
To date, several approaches have been proposed
for phishing webpage detection (Sect. 2). Most of
them are based on comparing the candidate phishing
webpage against a set of known targets [10, 11], or
on extracting some generic features to discriminate
between phishing and legitimate webpages [12, 14].
To our knowledge, this is the first work that lever-
ages the adversarial behavior of cyber-criminals to
detect phishing pages in compromised websites, while
overcoming some limitations of previous work. The
key idea behind our approach, named DeltaPhish
(or δPhish, for short), is to compare the HTML
code and the visual appearance of potential phish-
ing pages against the corresponding characteristics of
the homepage of the compromised (hosting) website
(Sect. 3). In fact, phishing pages normally exhibit
a much significant difference in terms of aspect and
structure with respect to the website homepage than
the other legitimate pages of the website. The under-
lying reason is that phishing pages should resemble
the appearance of the website targeted by the scam,
while legitimate pages typically share the same style
and aspect of their homepage (see, e.g., Fig. 1).
Our approach is also robust to well-crafted manipu-
lations of the HTML code of the phishing page, aimed
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to evade detection, as those performed in [15] to mis-
lead the Google’s Phishing Pages Filter embedded in
the Chrome web browser. This is achieved by the pro-
posal of two distinct adversarial fusion schemes that
combine the outputs of our HTML and visual anal-
yses while accounting for potential attacks against
them. We consider attacks targeting the HTML code
of the phishing page as altering also its visual appear-
ance may significantly affect the effectiveness of the
phishing scam. Preserving the visual similarity be-
tween a phishing page and the website targeted by
the scam is indeed a fundamental trust-building tac-
tic used by miscreants to attract new victims [1].
In Sect. 4, we simulate a case study in which
δPhish is deployed as a module of a web application
firewall, used to protect a specific website. In this
setting, our approach can be used to detect whether
users are accessing potential phishing webpages that
are uploaded to the monitored website after its com-
promise. To simulate this scenario, we collect legiti-
mate and phishing webpages hosted in compromised
websites from PhishTank, and compare each of them
with the corresponding homepage (which can be set
as the reference page for δPhish when configuring
the web application firewall). We show that, un-
der this setting, δPhish is able to correctly detect
more than 99% of the phishing pages while misclassi-
fying less than 1% of legitimate pages. We also show
that δPhish can retain detection rates higher than
70% even in the presence of adversarial attacks care-
fully crafted to evade it. To encourage reproducibil-
ity of our research, we have also made our dataset of
1, 012 phishing and 4, 499 legitimate webpages pub-
licly available, along with the classification results of
δPhish.
We conclude our work in Sect. 5, highlighting its
main limitations and related open issues for future
research.
2 Phishing Webpage Detection
We categorize here previous work on the detection of
phishing webpages along two main axes, depending
on (i) the detection approach, and (ii) the features
used for classification. The detection approach can
be target-independent, if it exploits generic features
to discriminate between phishing and legitimate web-
pages, or target-dependent, if it compares the suspect
phishing webpage against known phishing targets. In
both cases, features can be extracted from the web-
page URL, its HTML content and visual appearance,
as detailed below.
Target-independent. These approaches exploit
features computed from the webpage URL and its
domain name [16, 14, 17, 18], from its HTML con-
tent and structure, and from other sources, includ-
ing search engines, HTTP cookies, website certifi-
cates [19, 20, 10, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], and even
publicly-available blacklisting services like Google
Safe Browsing and PhishTank [26]. Another line of
work has considered the detection of phishing emails
by analyzing their content along with that of the
linked phishing webpages [27].
Target-dependent. These techniques typically
compare the potential phishing page to a set of known
targets (e.g., PayPal, eBay). HTML analysis has
also been exploited to this end, often complemented
by the use of search engines to identify phishing
pages with similar text and page layout [24, 28],
or by the analysis of the pages linked to (or by)
the suspect pages [29]. The main difference with
target-independent approaches is that most of the
target-dependent approaches have considered mea-
sures of visual similarity between webpage snapshots
or embedded images, using a wide range of image
analysis techniques, mostly based on computing low-
level visual features, including color histograms, two-
dimensional Haar wavelets, and other well-known im-
age descriptors normally exploited in the field of com-
puter vision [30, 31, 12, 13]. Notably, only few work
has considered the combination of both HTML and
visual characteristics [11, 32].
Limitations and Open Issues. The main limi-
tations of current approaches and the related open
research issues can be summarized as follows. De-
spite target-dependent approaches are normally more
effective than target-independent ones, they require
a-priori knowledge of the set of websites that may
be potentially targeted by phishing scams, or any-
way try to retrieve them during operation by query-
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ing search engines. This makes them clearly unable
to detect phishing scams against unknown, legitimate
services. On the other hand, target-independent tech-
niques are, in principle, easier to evade, as they ex-
ploit generic characteristics of webpages to discrimi-
nate between phishing and legitimate pages, instead
of making an explicit comparison between webpages.
In particular, as shown in [15], it is not only possi-
ble to infer enough information on how a publicly-
available, target-independent anti-phishing filter (like
Google’s Phishing Pages Filter) works, but it is also
possible to exploit this information to evade detec-
tion, by carefully manipulating phishing webpages
to resemble the characteristics of the legitimate web-
pages used to learn the classification system. Evasion
becomes clearly more difficult if visual analysis is also
performed, as modifying the visual appearance of the
phishing page tends to compromise the effectiveness
of the phishing scam [1]. However, mainly due to
the higher computational complexity of this kind of
analysis, only few approaches have combined HTML
and visual features for target-dependent phishing de-
tection [11, 32], and it is not clear to which extent
they can be robust against well-crafted adversarial at-
tacks. Another relevant limitation is that no dataset
has been made publicly available for comparing dif-
ferent detection approaches to a common benchmark,
and this clearly hinders research reproducibility.
Our approach overcomes many of the aforemen-
tioned limitations. First, it does not require any
knowledge of legitimate websites potentially targeted
by phishing scams. Although it may be thus consid-
ered a target-independent approach, it is not based
on extracting generic features from phishing and le-
gitimate webpages, but rather on comparing the char-
acteristics of the phishing page to those of the home-
page hosted in the compromised website. This makes
it more robust than other target-independent ap-
proaches against evasion attempts in which, e.g., the
HTML code of the phishing webpage is obfuscated,
as this would make the phishing webpage even more
different from the homepage. Furthermore, we ex-
plicitly consider a security-by-design approach while
engineering our system, based on explicitly account-
ing for well-crafted attacks against it. As we will
show, our adversarial fusion mechanisms guarantee
high detection rates even under worst-case changes
in the HTML code of phishing pages, by effectively
leveraging the role of the visual analysis. Finally, we
publicly release our dataset to encourage research re-
producibility and benchmarking.
3 DeltaPhish
In this section we present DeltaPhish (δPhish). Its
name derives from the fact that it determines whether
a certain URL contains a phishing webpage by evalu-
ating HTML and visual differences between the input
page and the website homepage. The general archi-
tecture of δPhish is depicted in Fig. 2. We denote
with x ∈ X either the URL of the input webpage or
the webpage itself, interchangeably. Accordingly, the
set X represents all possible URLs or webpages. The
homepage hosted in the same domain of the visited
page (or its URL) is denoted with x0 ∈ X . Initially,
our system receives the input URL of the input web-
page x and retrieves that of the corresponding home-
page x0. Each of these URLs is received as input
by a browser automation module (Sect. 3.1), which
downloads the corresponding page and outputs its
HTML code and a snapshot image. The HTML code
of the input page and that of the homepage are then
used to compute a set of HTML features (Sect. 3.2).
Similarly, the two snapshot images are passed to an-
other feature extractor that computes a set of visual
features (Sect. 3.3). The goal of these feature ex-
tractors is to map the input page x onto a vector
space suitable for learning a classification function.
Recall that both feature sets are computed based on
a comparison between the characteristics of the input
page x and those of the homepage x0. We denote the
two mapping functions implemented by the HTML
and by the visual feature extractor respectively with
δ1(x) ∈ Rd1 and δ2(x) ∈ Rd2 , being d1, d2 the di-
mensionality of the two vector spaces. For compact-
ness of our notation, we do not explicitly highlight
the dependency of δ1(x) and δ2(x) on x0, even if it
should be clear that such functions depend on both
x and x0. These two vectorial-based representations
are then used to learn two distinct classifiers, i.e.,
an HTML- and a Snapshot-based classifier. During
operation, these classifiers will respectively output a
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Figure 2: High-level architecture of δPhish.
dissimilarity score s1(x) ∈ R and s2(x) ∈ R for each
input page x, which essentially measure how different
the input page is from the corresponding homepage.
Thus, the higher the score, the higher the probabil-
ity of x being a phishing page. These scores are then
combined using different (standard and adversarial)
fusion schemes (Sect. 3.4), to output an aggregated
score g(x) ∈ R. If g(x) ≥ 0, the input page x is
classified as a phish, and as legitimate otherwise.
Before delving into the technical implementation
of each module, it is worth remarking that δPhish
can be implemented as a module in web application
firewalls, and, potentially, also as an online black-
listing service (to filter suspicious URLs). Some im-
plementation details that can be used to speed up
the processing time of our approach are discussed in
Sect. 4.2.
3.1 Browser Automation
The browser automation module launches a browser
instance using Selenium1 to gather the snapshot of
the landing web page and its HTML source, even if
the latter is dynamically generated with (obfuscated)
JavaScript code. This is indeed a common case for
phishing webpages.
1http://docs.seleniumhq.org
3.2 HTML-Based Classification
For HTML-based classification, we define a set of 11
features, obtained by comparing the input page x
and the homepage x0 of the website hosted in the
same domain. They will be the elements of the d1-
dimensional feature vector δ1(x) (with d1 = 11) de-
picted in Fig. 2. We use the Jaccard index J as a
similarity measure to compute most of the feature
values. Given two sets A,B, it is defined as the cardi-
nality of their intersection divided by the cardinality
of their union:
J(A,B) = |A ∩B|/|A ∪B| ∈ [0, 1] . (1)
If A and B are both empty, J(A,B) = 1. The 11
HTML features used by our approach are described
below.
(1) URL. We extract all URLs corresponding to hy-
perlinks in x and x0 through the inspection of the
href attribute of the <a> tag,2 and create a set for
each page. URLs are considered once in each set
without repetition. We then compute the Jaccard
index (Eq. 1) of the two sets extracted. For instance,
let us assume that x and x0 respectively contain these
two URL sets:
Ux : {https://www.example.com/p1/,
https://www.example.com/p2/,
https://support.example.com/}
2Recall that the <a> tag defines a hyperlink and the href
attribute is its destination.
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Ux0 : {https://support.example.com/p1,
https://www.example.com/p2/,
https://support.example.com/en-us/ht20}
In this case, since only one element
is exactly the same in both sets (i.e.,
https://www.example.com/p2/), the Jaccard
index is J(Ux, Ux0) = 0.2.
(2) 2LD. This feature is similar to the previous one,
except that we consider the second-level domains
(2LDs) extracted from each URL instead of the full
link. The 2LDs are considered once in each set with-
out repetition. Let us now consider the example given
for the computation of the previous feature. In this
case, both Ux and Ux0 will contain only example.com,
and, thus, J(Ux, Ux0) = 1.
(3) SS. To compute this feature, we extract the con-
tent of the <style> tags from x and x0. They are
used to define style information, and every webpage
can embed multiple <style> tags. We compare the
similarity between the sets of <style> tags of x and
x0 using the Jaccard index.
(4) SS-URL. We extract URLs from x and x0 that
point to external style sheets through the inspec-
tion of the href attribute of the <link> tag; e.g.,
http://example.com/resources/styles.css. We
create a set of URLs for x and another for x0 (where
every URL appears once in each set, without repeti-
tion), and compute their similarity using the Jaccard
index (Eq. 1).
(5) SS-2LD. As for the previous feature, we extract
all the URLs that link external style sheets in x and
x0. However, in this case we only consider the second-
level domains for each URL (e.g., example.com). The
feature value is then computed again using the Jac-
card index (Eq. 1).
(6) I-URL. For this feature, we consider the URLs
of linked images in x and in x0, separately, by ex-
tracting all the URLs specified in the <img src=...>
attributes. The elements of these two sets are image
URLs;
e.g., http://example.com/img/image.jpg, and are
considered once in each set without repetition. We
then compute the Jaccard index for these two sets
(Eq. 1).
(7) I-2LD. We consider the same image URLs ex-
tracted for I-URL, but restricted to their 2LDs.
Each 2LD is considered once in each set without rep-
etition, and the feature value is computed using again
the Jaccard index (Eq. 1).
(8) Copyright. We extract all significant words,
sentences and symbols found in x and x0 that can
be related to copyright claims (e.g., c©, copyright,
all rights reserved), without repetitions, and exclud-
ing stop-words of all human languages. The feature
value is then computed using the Jaccard index.
(9) X-links. This is a binary feature. It equals 1 if
the homepage x0 is linked in x (accounting for po-
tential redirections), and 0 otherwise.
(10) Title. This feature is also computed using the
Jaccard index. We create the two sets to be compared
by extracting all words (except stop-words) from the
title of x and x0, respectively, without repetitions.
They can be found within the tag <title>, which
defines the title of the HTML document, i.e., the one
appearing on the browser toolbar and displayed in
search-engine results.
(11) Language. This feature is set to 1 if x and
x0 use the same language, and to 0 otherwise. To
identify the language of a page, we first extract the
stop-words for all the human languages known from x
and x0, separately, and without repetitions. We then
assume that the page language is that associated to
the maximum number of corresponding stop-words
found.
Classification. The 11 HTML features map our in-
put page x onto a vector space suitable for classifi-
cation. Using the compact notation defined at the
beginning of this section (see also Fig. 2), we denote
the d1-dimensional feature vector corresponding to x
as δ1(x) (being d1 = 11). We then train a linear Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) [33] on these features to
classify phishing and legitimate pages. For each in-
put page, during operation, this classifier computes a
dissimilarity score measuring how different the input
page is from its homepage:
s1(x) = w
T
1 δ1(x) + b1 . (2)
The feature weights w1 ∈ Rd1 and the bias b1 ∈ R of
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the classification function are optimized during SVM
learning, using a labeled set of training webpages [33].
3.3 Snapshot-Based Classification
To analyze differences in the snapshots of the input
page x and the corresponding homepage x0, we lever-
age two state-of-the-art feature representations that
are widely used for image classification, i.e., the so-
called Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOGs) [34],
and color histograms. We have selected these features
since, with respect to other popular descriptors (like
the Scale-Invariant Feature Transform, SIFT), they
typically achieve better performance in the presence
of very high inter-class similarities. Unlike HOGs,
which are local descriptors, color histograms give a
representation of the spatial distribution of colors
within an image, providing complementary informa-
tion to our snapshot analysis.
We exploit these two representations to compute a
concatenated (stacked) feature vector for each snap-
shot image, and then define a way to compute a
similarity-based representation from them. The over-
all architecture of our snapshot-based classifier is de-
picted in Fig. 3. In the following, we explain more
in detail how HOG and color histograms are com-
puted for each snapshot image separately, and how
we combine the stacked feature vectors of the input
page x and of the homepage x0 to obtain the final
similarity-based feature vector.
Image Tiling. To preserve spatial information in
our visual representation of the snapshot, we extract
visual features not only from the whole snapshot im-
age, but also from its quarters and sixteenths (as de-
picted in Fig. 4), yielding (1×1)+(2×2)+(4×4) = 21
tiles. HOG descriptors and color histograms are ex-
tracted from each tile, and stacked, to obtain two
vectors of 21 × 300 = 6, 300 and 21 × 288 = 6, 048
dimensions, respectively.
HOG features. We compute the HOG features for
each of the 21 input image tiles following the steps
highlighted in Fig. 5 and detailed below, as in [34].
First, the image is divided in cells of 8×8 pixels. For
each cell, a 31-dimensional HOG descriptor is com-
puted, in which each bin represents a quantized di-
rection and its value corresponds to the magnitude
of gradients in that direction (we refer the reader
to [36, 34, 35] for further details). The second step
consists of considering overlapping blocks of 2 × 2
neighboring cells (i.e., 16×16 pixels). For each block,
the 31-dimensional HOG descriptors of the four cells
are simply concatenated to form a (31 × 4) 124-
dimensional stacked HOG descriptor, also referred to
as a visual word. In the third step, each visual word
extracted from the image tile is compared against
a pre-computed vocabulary of K visual words, and
assigned to the closest word in the vocabulary (we
have used K = 300 visual words in our experiments).
Eventually, a histogram of K = 300 bins is obtained
for the whole tile image, where each bin represents
the occurrence of each pre-computed visual word in
the tile. This approach is usually referred to as Bag
of Visual Words (BoVW) [37]. The vocabulary can
be built using the centroids found by k-means cluster-
ing from the whole set of visual words in the training
data. Alternatively, a vocabulary computed from a
different dataset may be also used.
Color features. To extract our color features,
we first convert the image from the RGB (Red-
Green-Blue) to the HSV (Hue-Saturation-Value)
color space, and perform the same image tiling done
for the extraction of the HOG features (see Fig. 4).
We then compute a quantized 3D color histogram
with 8, 12 and 3 bins respectively for the H, S and V
channel, corresponding to a vector of 8×12×3 = 288
feature values. This technique has shown to be ca-
pable of outperforming histograms computed in the
RGB color space, in content-based image retrieval
and image segmentation tasks [38].
Both the HOG descriptor and the color histogram
obtained from each image tile are normalized to sum
up to one (to correctly represent the relative fre-
quency of each bin). The resulting 21 × 300 HOG
descriptors and 21 × 288 color histograms are then
stacked to obtain a feature vector consisting of d2 =
12, 348 feature values, as shown in Fig. 3. In the fol-
lowing, we denote this vector respectively with p and
p0 for the input page x and the homepage x0.
Similarity-based Feature Representation. Af-
ter computing the visual features p for the input
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Figure 4: δPhish image tiling extracts visual features retaining spatial information.
page x and p0 for the homepage x0, we compute the
similarity-based representation δ2(x) (Figs. 2-3) from
these feature vectors as:
δ2(x) = min(p,p0) (3)
where min here returns the minimum of the two vec-
tors for each coordinate. Thus, the vector δ2(x) will
also consists of d2 = 12, 348 feature values.
Classification. The similarity-based mapping in
Eq. (3) is inspired to the histogram intersection ker-
nel [39]. This kernel evaluates the similarity between
two histograms u and v as
∑
i min(ui, vi). Instead
of summing up the values of δ2(x) (which will give
us exactly the histogram intersection kernel between
the input page and the homepage), we learn a linear
SVM to estimate a weighted sum:
s2(x) = w
T
2 δ2(x) + b2 , (4)
where, similarly to the HTML-based classifier, w2 ∈
Rd2 and b2 ∈ R are the feature weights and bias,
respectively. This enables us to achieve better per-
formances, as, in practice, the classifier itself learns a
proper similarity measure between webpages directly
from the training data. This is a well-known practice
in the area of machine learning, usually referred to
as similarity learning [40].
3.4 Classifier Fusion
The outputs of the HTML- and of the Snapshot-
based classifiers, denoted in the following with a two-
dimensional vector s = (s1(x), s2(x)) (Eqs. 2-4), can
be combined using a fixed (untrained) fusion rule, or
a classifier (trained fusion). We consider three differ-
ent combiners in our experiments, as described below.
Maximum. This rule simply computes the overall
score as:
g(x) = max (s1(x), s2(x)) . (5)
The idea is that, for a page to be classified as legit-
imate, both classifiers should output a low score. If
one of the two classifiers outputs a high score and
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classifies the page as a phish, then the overall sys-
tem will also classify it as a phishing page. The rea-
son behind this choice relies upon the fact that the
HTML-based classifier can be evaded by a skilled at-
tacker, as we will see in our experiments, and we aim
to avoid that misleading such a classifier will suffice
to evade the whole system. In other words, we would
like our system to be evaded only if both classifiers
are successfully fooled by the attacker. For this rea-
son, this simple rule can be also considered itself a
sort of adversarial fusion scheme.
Trained Fusion. To implement this fusion mecha-
nism, we use an SVM with the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) kernel, which computes the overall score as:
g(x) =
∑n
i=1 yiαik(s, si) + b , (6)
where k(s, si) = exp (−γ‖s− si‖2) is the RBF ker-
nel function, γ is the kernel parameter, and s =
(s1(x), s2(x)) and si = (s1(xi), s2(xi)) are the scores
provided by the HTML- and Snapshot-based classi-
fiers for the input page x and for the n pages in our
training set D = {xi, yi}ni=1, being yi ∈ {−1,+1} the
class label (i.e., −1 and +1 for legitimate and phish-
ing pages). The classifier parameters {αi}ni=1 and b
are estimated during training by the SVM learning
algorithm, on the set of scores S = {si, yi}ni=1, which
can be computed through stacked generalization (to
avoid overfitting [41]) as explained in Sect. 4.1.
Adversarial Fusion. In this case, we consider the
same trained fusion mechanism described above, but
augment the training scores by simulating attacks
against the HTML-based classifier. In particular,
we add a fraction of samples for which the score of
the Snapshot-based classifier is not altered, while the
score of the HTML-based classifier is randomly sam-
pled from a uniform distribution in [0, 1]. This is a
straightforward way to account for the fact that the
score of the HTML-based classifier can be potentially
decreased by a targeted attack against that module,
and make the combiner aware of this potential threat.
Some examples of the resulting decision functions
are shown in Fig. 7. Worth remarking, when us-
ing trained fusion rules, the output scores of the the
HTML- and Snapshot-based classifiers are normal-
ized in [0, 1] using min-max normalization, to facili-
tate learning (see Sect. 4.1 for further details).
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we empirically evaluate δPhish, sim-
ulating its application as a module in a web applica-
tion firewall. Under this scenario, we assume that the
monitored website has been compromised (e.g., using
a phishing kit), and it is hosting a phishing webpage.
The URLs contacted by users visiting the website are
monitored by the web application firewall, which can
deny access to a resource if retained suspicious (or
which can stop a request if retained a potential at-
tack against the web server). The contacted URLs
that are not blocked by the web application firewall
are forwarded to δPhish, which detects whether they
are substantially different from the homepage (i.e.,
they are potential phishing pages hosted in the mon-
itored website). If δPhish reveals such a sign of com-
promise, the web application firewall can deny user
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access to the corresponding URL.
We first discuss the characteristics of the webpages
we have collected from legitimate, compromised web-
sites (hosting phishing scams) to build our dataset,
along with the settings used to run our experiments
(Sect. 4.1). We then report our results, showing that
our system can detect most of the phishing pages
with very high accuracy, while misclassifying only
few legitimate webpages (Sect. 4.2). We have also
considered an adversarial evaluation of our system
in which the characteristics of the phishing pages
are manipulated to evade detection of the HTML-
based classifier. The goal of this adversarial analysis
is to show that δPhish can successfully resist even to
worst-case evasive attempts. Notably, we have not
considered attacks against the Snapshot-based clas-
sifier as they would require modifying the visual as-
pect of the phishing page, thus making it easier for
the victim to recognize the phishing scam.
4.1 Experimental Setting
Dataset. Our dataset has been collected from Oc-
tober 2015 to January 2016, starting from active
phishing URLs obtained online from the PhishTank
feed.3 We have collected and manually validated
1, 012 phishing pages. For each phishing page, we
have then collected the corresponding homepage from
the hosting domain. By parsing the hyperlinks in
the HTML code of the homepage, we have collected
from 3 to 5 legitimate pages from the same website,
and validated them manually. This has allowed us to
gather 1, 012 distinct sets of webpages, from now on
referred to as families, each consisting of a phishing
page and some legitimate pages collected from the
same website. Overall, our dataset consists of 5, 511
distinct webpages, 1, 012 of which are phishing pages.
We make this data publicly available, along with the
classification results of δPhish.4
In these experiments, we consider 20 distinct
training-test pairs to average our results. For a fair
evaluation, webpages collected from the same domain
(i.e., belonging to the same family) are included ei-
ther in the training data or in the test data. In each
3https://www.phishtank.com
4http://deltaphish.pluribus-one.it/
repetition, we randomly select 60% of the families for
training, while the remaining 40% are used for test-
ing. We normalize the feature values δ1(x) and δ2(x)
using min-max normalization, but estimating the 5th
and the 95th percentile from the training data for
each feature value, instead of the minimum and the
maximum, to reduce the influence of outlying feature
values.
This setting corresponds to the case in which
δPhish is trained before deployment on the web ap-
plication firewall, to detect phishing webpages inde-
pendently from the specific website being monitored.
It is nevertheless worth pointing out that our system
can also be trained using only the legitimate pages
of the monitored website, i.e., it can be customized
depending on the specific deployment.
Classifiers. We consider the HTML- and Snapshot-
based classifiers (Sects. 3.2-3.3), using the three fu-
sion rules discussed in Sect. 3.4 to combine their out-
puts: (i) Fusion (max.), in which the max rule is
used to combine the two outputs (Eq. 5); (ii) Fusion
(tr.), in which we use an SVM with the RBF kernel
as the combiner (Eq. 6); and (iii) Fusion (adv.), in
which we also use an SVM with the RBF kernel as the
combiner, but augment the training set with phish-
ing webpages adversarially manipulated to evade the
HTML-based classifier.
Parameter tuning. For HTML- and Snapshot-
based classifiers, the only parameter to be tuned is
the regularization parameter C of the SVM algo-
rithm. For SVM-based combiners exploiting the RBF
kernel, we also have to set the kernel parameter γ. In
both cases, we exploit a 5-fold cross-validation pro-
cedure to tune the parameters, by performing a grid
search on C, γ ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100}. As the
trained fusion rules require a separate training set for
the base classifiers and the combiner (to avoid over-
fitting), we run a two-level (nested) cross-validation
procedure, usually referred to as stacked generaliza-
tion [41]. In particular, the outer 5-fold cross vali-
dation splits the training data into a further train-
ing and validation set. This training set is used to
tune the parameters (using an inner 5-fold cross val-
idation as described above) and train the base clas-
sifiers. Then, these classifiers are evaluated on the
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validation data, and their outputs on each validation
sample are stored. We normalize these output scores
in [0, 1] using min-max normalization. At the end of
the outer cross-validation procedure, we have com-
puted the outputs of the base classifiers for each of the
initial training samples, i.e., the set S = {si, yi}ni=1
(Sect. 3.4). We can thus optimize the parameters of
the combiner on this data and then learn the fusion
rule on all data. For the adversarial fusion, we set
the fraction of simulated attacks added to the train-
ing score set to 30% (Sect. 3.4).
4.2 Experimental Results
The results for phishing detection are shown in Fig. 6
(left plot), using Receiver-Operating-Characteristic
(ROC) curves. Each curve reports the average de-
tection rate of phishing pages (i.e., the true positive
rate, TP) against the fraction of misclassified legiti-
mate pages (i.e., the false positive rate, FP).
The HTML-based classifier is able to detect more
than 97% of phishing webpages while misclassifying
less than 0.5% of legitimate webpages, demonstrat-
ing the effectiveness of exploiting differences in the
HTML code of phishing and legitimate pages. The
Snapshot-based classifier is not able to reach such ac-
curacy since in some cases legitimate webpages may
have some different visual appearance, and the vi-
sual learning task is inherently more complex. The
visual classifier is indeed trained on a much higher
number of features than the HTML-based one. Nev-
ertheless, the detection rate of the Snapshot-based
classifier is higher than 80% at 1% FP, which is still
a significant achievement for this classification task.
Note finally that both trained and max fusion rules
are able to achieve accuracy similar to those of the
HTML-based classifier, while the adversarial fusion
performs slightly worse. This behavior is due to the
fact that injecting simulated attacks into the train-
ing score set of the combiner causes an increase of
the false positive rate (see Fig. 7). This highlights
a tradeoff between system security under attack and
accuracy in the absence of targeted attacks against
the HTML-based classifier.
Processing time. We have run our experiments
on a personal computer equipped with an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 0 operating at 2.30GHz and
4 GB RAM. The processing time of δPhish is clearly
dominated by the browser automation module, which
has to retrieve the HTML code and snapshot of the
considered pages. This process typically requires few
seconds (as estimated, on average, on our dataset).
The subsequent HTML-based classification is instan-
taneous, while the Snapshot-based classifier requires
more than 1.2 seconds, on average, to compute its
similarity score. This delay is mainly due to the ex-
traction of the HOG features, while the color features
are extracted in less than 3 ms, on average. The
processing time of our approach can be speeded up
using parallel computation (e.g., through the imple-
mentation of a scalable application on a cloud com-
puting service), and a caching mechanism to avoid
re-classifying known pages.
Adversarial Evasion. We consider here an attacker
that manipulates the HTML code of his/her phish-
ing page to resemble that of the homepage of the
compromised website, aiming to evade detection by
our HTML-based classifier. We simulate a worst-
case scenario in which the attacker has perfect knowl-
edge of such a classifier, i.e., that he/she knows the
weights assigned by the classifier to each HTML fea-
ture. The idea of this evasion attack is to maximally
decrease the classification score of the HTML mod-
ule while manipulating the minimum number of fea-
tures, as in [42]. In this case, an optimal attack will
start manipulating features having the highest abso-
lute weight values. For simplicity, we assume a worst
case attack, where the attacker can modify a feature
value either to 0 or 1, although this may not be pos-
sible for all features without compromising the na-
ture of the phishing scam. For instance, in order to
set the URL feature to 1 (see Sect. 3.2), an attacker
has to use exactly the same set of URLs present in
the compromised website’s homepage. This might
require removing some links from the phishing page,
compromising its malicious functionality.
The distribution of the feature weights (and bias)
for the HTML-based classifier (computed over the 20
repetitions of our experiment) is shown in the boxplot
of Fig. 8, highlighting two interesting facts. First, fea-
tures tend to be assigned only negative weights. This
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Figure 7: Examples of decision functions (in colors) for maximum (left), trained fusion (center), and ad-
versarial fusion (right), in the space of the base classifiers’ outputs. Blue (red) points represent legitimate
(phishing) pages. Decision boundaries are shown as black lines. Phishing pages manipulated to evade the
HTML-based classifier will receive a lower score (i.e., the red points will be shifted to the left), and most
likely evade only the trained fusion.
means that each feature tends to exhibit higher val-
ues for legitimate pages, and that the attacker should
increase its value to mislead detection. Since the bias
is generally positive, a page tends to be classified
generally as a phish, unless there is sufficient “evi-
dence” that it is similar to the homepage. Second,
the most relevant features (i.e., those which tend to
be assigned the lowest negative weights) are Title,
URL, SS-URL, and I-URL. This will be, in most of
the cases, the first four features to be increased by
the attacker to evade detection, while the remaining
features play only a minor role in the classification of
phishing and legitimate pages.
The results are reported in Fig. 6 (right plot). It
shows how the detection rate achieved by δPhish
at 1% FP decreases against an increasing number
of HTML features modified by the attacker, for the
different fusion schemes and the HTML-based classi-
fier. The first interesting finding is about the HTML-
based classifier, that can be evaded by modifying only
a single feature (most likely, URL). The trained fu-
sion remains slightly more robust, although it ex-
hibits a dramatic performance drop already at the
early stages of the attack. Conversely, the detection
rate of maximum and adversarial fusion rules under
attack remains higher than 70%. The underlying rea-
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Figure 8: Boxplot of feature weights (and bias) for
the HTML-based classifier.
son is that they rely more upon the output of the
Snapshot-based classifier with respect to the trained
fusion. In fact, as already mentioned, such schemes
explicitly account for the presence of attacks against
the base classifiers. Note also that the adversarial
fusion outperforms maximum when only one feature
is modified, while achieving a similar detection rate
at the later stages of the attack. This clearly comes
at the cost of a worse performance in the absence
of attack. Thus, if one retains that such evasion at-
tempts may be very likely in practice, he/she may
decide to trade accuracy in the absence of attack for
an improved level of security against these potential
manipulations. This tradeoff can also be tuned in a
more fine-grained manner by varying the percentage
of simulated attacks while training the adversarial
fusion scheme (which we set to 30%), and also by
considering a less pessimistic score distribution than
the uniform one (e.g., a Beta distribution skewed to-
wards the average score assigned by the HTML-based
classifier to the phishing pages).
5 Conclusions and Future
Work
The widespread presence of public, exploitable web-
sites in the wild has enabled a large-scale deployment
of modern phishing scams. We have observed that
phishing pages hosted in compromised websites ex-
hibit a different aspect and structure from those of
the legitimate pages hosted in the same website, for
two main reasons: (i) to be effective, phishing pages
should resemble the visual appearance of the website
targeted by the scam; and (ii) leaving the legitimate
pages intact guarantees that phishing pages remain
active for a longer period of time before being black-
listed. Website compromise can be thus regarded as a
simple pivoting step in the implementation of modern
phishing attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that leverages this aspect for phishing webpage de-
tection. By comparing the HTML code and the vi-
sual appearance of a potential phishing page with the
homepage of the corresponding website, δPhish ex-
hibits high detection accuracy even in the presence
of well-crafted, adversarial manipulation of HTML
code. While our results are encouraging, our pro-
posal has its own limitations. It is clearly not able
to detect phishing pages hosted through other means
than compromised websites. It may be adapted to
address this issue by comparing the webpage to be
classified against a set of known phishing targets
(e.g., PayPal, eBay); in this case, if the similarity
exceeds a given threshold, then the page is classified
as a phish. Another limitation is related to the as-
sumption that legitimate pages within a certain web-
site share a similar appearance/HTML code with the
homepage. This assumption may be indeed violated,
leading the system to misclassify some pages. We
believe that such errors can be limited by extending
the comparison between the potential phishing page
and the website homepage also to the other legitimate
pages in the website (and this can be configured at
the level of the web application firewall). This is an
interesting evaluation for future work.
Our adversarial evaluation also exhibits some lim-
itations. We have considered an attacker that de-
liberately modifies the HTML code of the phishing
page to evade detection. A more advanced attacker
might also modify the phishing page to evade our
snapshot-based classifier. This is clearly more com-
plex, as he/she should not compromise the visual ap-
pearance of the phishing page while aiming to evade
our visual analysis. Moreover, the proposed adver-
sarial fusion (i.e., the maximum) already accounts for
this possibility, and the attack can be successful only
if both the HTML and snapshot-based classifiers are
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fooled. We anyway leave a more detailed investiga-
tion of this aspect to future work, along with the pos-
sibility of training our system using only legitimate
data, which would alleviate the burden of collecting
a set of manually-labeled phishing webpages.
Finally, it is worth remarking that we have experi-
mented on more than 5, 500 webpages collected in the
wild, which we have also made publicly available for
research reproducibility. Despite this, it is clear that
our data should be extended to include more exam-
ples of phishing and legitimate webpages, hopefully
through the help of other researchers, to get more
reliable insights on the validity of phishing webpage
detection approaches.
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